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Abstract. 
 
Previous research has demonstrated working memory and executive deficits in 
recreational users of MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine; “Ecstasy”). In 
turn, both of these constructs have been implicated in syllogistic reasoning 
performance. Twenty-two MDMA users (mean age 21.36) and 26 non-MDMA user 
controls (mean age 21.31) were tested on syllogisms of varying difficulty, and on 
measures of working memory and executive functioning. MDMA users were 
significantly impaired in aspects of syllogistic reasoning and the effect remained 
significant after controls for the use of other drugs. However, the MDMA-related 
variance was reduced to below statistical significance following control for group 
differences in working memory span. The results are consistent with the possibility 
that MDMA-related deficits in aspects of executive functioning result in impaired 
reasoning performance among MDMA users.  
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Syllogistic reasoning performance in normal populations has been shown to 
rely on working memory and executive resources (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky and 
Judd, 1994). The purpose of the present paper was to establish whether MDMA-
related deficits in these aspects of cognitive functioning (Curran & Travill, 1997; 
Morgan, McFie, Fleetwood & Robinson, 2002) might give rise to syllogistic 
reasoning deficits. Since syllogistic reasoning is generally regarded as an indicator of 
the capacity for rational thought, MDMA-related deficits on this measure raise the 
possibility that extensive use of MDMA might be associated with impaired rational 
thinking. 
A key construct in cognitive psychology is Baddeley’s (1986) model of 
working memory. The model consists of phonological and visuo spatial components 
and an executive system which co-ordinates these and is responsible for managing 
goal directed behaviour and reconciling processing conflicts. The working memory 
system is believed to underpin a wide range of key cognitive processes, for example, 
learning to read (Hitch, Towse, & Hutton, 2001) the development of arithmetic 
competence (Hitch et al, 2001; Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003), knowledge and skill 
acquisition (Head, Raz, Gunning-Dixon, Williamson, & Acker, 2002) and thinking 
and reasoning (Stanovich & West, 2000). Previous and current MDMA users have 
been found to exhibit impairments in working memory functioning. For example, 
Wareing, Fisk, Murphy & Montgomery (2004) found that MDMA users were 
impaired on the computation span measure. Computation span is an established 
indicator of working memory functioning loading on both the phonological and 
executive components (Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Wareing et al (2004) observed 
that MDMA users were impaired specifically on the executive component of the task. 
MDMA related deficits have also been found in other aspects of executive 
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functioning, for example, the subtracting serial sevens task (Curran & Travill, 1997) 
and the Tower of London task (Fox, McLean, Turner, Parrott, Rogers, & Sahakian, 
2002). 
An important area of cognitive functioning that has not been directly 
addressed with regard to MDMA users is reasoning. Of the broad range of intellectual 
abilities that has been investigated, reasoning is perhaps the most cognitively 
demanding. There is cause to believe that among the many illicit drugs commonly in 
use, MDMA in particular has the potential to disrupt reasoning processes. The drug is 
believed to have long term adverse effects on the serotonin system (Morgan, 2000).  
In turn, the serotonin system is believed to underpin the operation of working memory 
processes through its modulation of the dopaminergic systems that support prefrontal 
executive processes (Luciana, Collins, & Depue, 1998; Robbins 2000). Indeed in his 
review of the literature, Morgan (2000, page234) has noted that ‘it has been proposed 
that it [serotonin] may play an orchestrating role in cognition’. However, the 
possibility that MDMA users might be impaired in reasoning, and more specifically in 
syllogistic reasoning, has not yet been investigated. 
Syllogistic reasoning requires a participant to draw valid inferences from a set 
of premises. For Example,  
  Given that:   Some A are B,  
and 
           No B are C 
 It follows that:  Some A are not C.  
 
Johnson-Laird (1983) maintains that reasoning involves constructing mental models 
of the premises and testing conclusions against these models. Constructing a single 
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model may solve some problems, others may require up to three models
1
. The more 
complex the problem, the greater number of models required and the greater the load 
on working memory and executive resources. Syllogistic reasoning is also believed to 
utilise resources outside of working memory, for example relations between linguistic 
concepts such as ‘all’, ‘some’ and the logical operator ‘not’, as well as spatial 
representations of class inclusion relationships (see, for example, Ford, 1995). 
Among the different measures of reasoning competence, syllogistic reasoning 
is perhaps one of the best known. It was central in the development of Johnson-
Laird’s mental models theory (Evans, Handley, Harper & Johnson-Laird, 1999; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983). Within a developmental context, it has been used as a key 
indicator of reasoning competence in early childhood (Lourenco & Machado, 1996) 
and over the adult lifespan (Gilinski & Judd, 1994; Fisk & Sharp, 2002). Syllogisms 
have also featured prominently in the debate on human rationality (e.g., Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Given that MDMA use has been associated with impaired working 
memory and executive functioning and that these cognitive constructs are believed to 
underpin syllogistic reasoning performance (e.g., see Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilhooly, 
Logie and Wynn, 1999), it seems reasonable to expect MDMA users might be 
impaired on this measure of reasoning ability.  
In evaluating the potential effects of MDMA, controls for the effects of other 
drugs, especially cannabis, are necessary. Cannabis has been found to adversely affect 
several aspects of executive functioning including the organisation and integration of 
information (Hall & Solowij, 1998), verbal fluency performance (Croft, Mackay, 
Mills, & Gruzelier, 2001; Klugman, Hardy, Baldeweg, & Gruzelie, 1999), and among 
heavy users, perseveration errors on the WCST (Pope & Yurgelun-Todd, 1996). 
While there is no direct evidence that cannabis affects syllogistic reasoning, since the 
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drug appears to impair certain executive processes, it is possible that reasoning might 
be affected as a consequence. The present study will therefore attempt to control for 
the effects of cannabis and other drugs. 
To sum up, it is expected that MDMA users will perform worse compared to 
controls in a syllogistic reasoning task and that the MDMA related deficit will be 
most pronounced on the two and three-model syllogisms, as these load most heavily 
on working memory and executive resources.  ANCOVA will be used to investigate 
the extent to which MDMA-related differences in syllogistic reasoning are related to 
group differences in working memory capacity and executive functioning. Working 
memory and executive functioning will be assessed through a computation span task 
and through random letter generation.  
 
METHOD. 
Participants.  
Twenty-two MDMA users (11 males, 11 females) and 26 non-MDMA user 
controls (10 males, 16 females) between the ages of 18-25 were recruited. Participants 
were initially recruited through direct approach to Liverpool John Moores University 
undergraduate students, including psychology majors and psychology-biology joint 
students. Subsequently, word of mouth referral was used, with most participants being 
recruited by this means. Participants were requested to refrain from MDMA use for at 
least 7 days and ideally 10 days prior to testing (the mean period of abstinence was 
actually 4.61 weeks). Participants were also requested not to use any other illicit drugs 
for at least 24 hours and ideally for 7 days prior to testing
2
. Participants were paid 15 
UK pounds in store vouchers for their participation. 
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Materials.  
Fluid intelligence was measured through Raven’s progressive matrices 
(Raven, Raven & Court, 1998).  Premorbid intelligence was assessed through the 
National Adult Reading Test (NART, Nelson 1982). A background questionnaire 
used by Montgomery, Fisk, and Newcombe (2004) assessed the use of MDMA and 
other drugs, as well as age, years of education, general health, and other lifestyle 
variables. In relation to other drugs, among other things, participants were asked to 
indicate their frequency of use and the last time that they had used each drug. 
Cigarettes smoked per day and units of alcohol consumed each week were also 
assessed. Participants were also questioned concerning their history of drug use. 
Using a procedure developed by Montgomery, et al (2004), these data were used to 
estimate total lifetime use for each drug.  
Syllogistic reasoning. The syllogisms were presented in abstract form as in the 
example set out above. Participants attempted to generate solutions for four one-
model syllogisms, four three-model syllogisms, and four syllogisms for which there 
was no valid conclusion (NVC). The syllogisms were the same as those used by Fisk 
and Sharp (2002). Scores were based on the number of correct solutions, or in the case 
of the NVC syllogisms, a response was deemed correct when the participant indicated 
that no valid conclusions were possible. According to Johnson-Laird (1983), NVC 
syllogisms require either two or three mental models in order to derive the correct 
solution. In the present study, two of the NVC syllogisms were two-model and two 
were three-model. Therefore, in terms of the number of models required, three-model 
and NVC syllogisms were the hardest, and one-model the easiest. The syllogisms 
used in the study were presented in random order. The test was administered 
following the procedure outlined by Fisk and Sharp (2002).  
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Working memory and executive functioning.  The computation span measure 
and random letter generation were used to assess these aspects of cognitive 
functioning. Computation span has been used as an indicator of working memory 
functioning in the cognitive ageing literature (Fisk & Warr, 1996; Salthouse & 
Babcock, 1991) and it is similar to the operation span measure used by Miyake, 
Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager (2000) in their investigation of 
executive processes. Participants were required to solve a number of arithmetic 
problems (e.g., 4+7 = ?) by circling one of three multiple-choice answers as each 
problem was presented. They were also required to simultaneously remember the 
second digit of each presented problem. At the end of each set of problems the second 
digits had to be recalled in the order in which they were presented. The number of 
arithmetic problems that the participant had to solve, while at the same time 
remembering each second digit, gradually increased as the test proceeded. For each of 
the first three trials only a single problem was presented. For the next three trials, two 
problems were presented. Subsequently, the number of problems presented per trial 
increased by one every third trial. In order to proceed, the participant was required to 
be correct in at least two of the three trials at the current level. Computation span was 
defined as the maximum number of end digits recalled in serial order, with the added 
requirement that the corresponding arithmetic problems had been solved correctly. 
Since computation span is reliant on both phonological and executive processing 
resources, a simple digit span task (Fisk & Warr, 1996) was also administered so that 
it could be ascertained that any observed MDMA related deficits were not simply a 
result of lower level non executive impairments (i.e., the phonological loop).  
Random generation is an established measure of executive functioning. For 
example it features prominently in both Baddeley’s (1996) and Miyake et al’s (2000) 
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accounts of executive processes and, using the dual task methodology, it has been 
studied directly in relation to syllogistic reasoning performance (Gilhooly et al, 1999). 
We used the procedure developed by Baddeley (1966). However, a computer display 
and concurrent auditory signal was used to pace responses. Participants were asked to 
speak aloud a letter every time the signal was presented. They were told to avoid 
repeating the same sequence of letters, to avoid producing alphabetical sequences, and 
to try to speak each letter with the same overall frequency. Individuals attempted to 
produce three sets of 100 letters; one set at a rate of one letter every 4 s, a second set 
at one letter every 2 s, and a third at one letter every 1 s. The order in which the sets 
were generated was randomised. The experimenter recorded the responses on an 
answer sheet. The test yields four scores, first, the number of alphabetically ordered 
pairs, second, a repeat sequences score, corresponding to the number of times that the 
same letter pair is repeated, third, a “redundancy” score, which measures the extent to 
which all 26 letters of the alphabet are produced equally often (0% being truly 
random), and fourth, the number of letters produced. In the first three cases, higher 
scores indicate poor performance; in the fourth the opposite is the case. The scores for 
each separate variable, at each of the three generation rates, were standardised. A 
single random generation score for each participant was produced by averaging the 
standardised scores, reversing the sign for the number of letters generated so that for 
the overall measure, a positive score was indicative of poor performance. 
Sleep Quality. Research has shown that MDMA users exhibit altered sleep 
patterns, with less total sleep time and qualitative changes in the characteristics of 
Stage 2 sleep (Allen, McCann & Ricaurte, 1993). It has been suggested that apparent 
MDMA-related cognitive deficits might simply be due to the fact that MDMA users 
get less sleep (Cole, Sumnall & Grob, 2002). To assess this possibility, a screening 
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questionnaire and the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (Johns, 1991) were used to 
investigate any group differences in sleep quality and wakefulness. The Epworth scale 
measures subjective daytime sleepiness. It contains eight items, which a participant 
has to score on a scale of 0 = would never doze off in this situation, to 3 = high 
chance of dozing off in this situation. Summing the responses to all eight items 
produced an overall total score. The screening questionnaire contained a number of 
questions on sleep quality, as detailed in the notes to Table 1. 
 
Procedure.  
Informed consent was obtained. The tests were administered under controlled 
laboratory conditions. A computer, using MS-DOS was used for the digit span, 
computation span and random letter generation tests. Tasks were administered in the 
following order: Health/education questionnaire, MDMA background questionnaire 
and sleep questionnaires, random letter generation, digit span test, computation span 
test, syllogistic reasoning test, NART, and finally Ravens progressive matrices. The 
order of the random generation, computation span and syllogistic reasoning tests was 
rotated, to eliminate order effects. Overall, testing took between two and three hours 
at the end of which, the participant was debriefed and provided with drug education 
leaflets. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of Liverpool John Moores 
University, and was administered in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the 
British Psychological Society.   
 
Design.  
A mixed design was used with MDMA user group (with two levels, user/non-
user) as the between participants variable, and level of difficulty of the syllogism 
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(again with two levels, low and high) as the within participants variable. Level of 
difficulty was based on the number of models required to derive a solution. Thus one-
model syllogisms were low in difficulty. Since the NVC and three-model syllogisms 
require a similar number of models to produce a solution, responses for these types 
were combined to form the high difficulty level. The dependent variable was the 
number of correct solutions for the low and high difficulty syllogisms (maximum 
score was eight in both cases). We also sought to determine whether the main effect 
of user group was qualified by a user-by-difficulty interaction. In common with 
established practice, analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to statistically 
control for group differences in potentially confounding or moderating variables (see 
for example, Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Morgan, 1999; Verkes, Gijsman, Pieters, Schoemaker, 
Visser, Kuijpers, et al, 2001; Wareing, Murphy, & Fisk, 2004). Thus, where appropriate, 
indices of other drug use, sleep quality, and working memory measures were included 
as covariates. 
 
RESULTS. 
Background Variables. 
Average age, years of education, fluid intelligence, premorbid intelligence, 
and other background variables for the two groups are set out in Table 1.  Statistical 
tests (ANOVA, t-test, Mann Whitney U, and Chi squared) revealed that there were 
some significant group differences among the background variables. MDMA users 
performed worse than non-users on the computation span test, F(1,45) = 15.92, 
p<.001. With regard to wakefulness, most users considered themselves to be evening 
types, whereas nonusers made neutral responses or stated that they were morning 
types, Mann-Whitney U =181.50, p<.05.  
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< Insert table 1 about here > 
Inspection of Table 2 reveals that the use of “other” drugs was commonplace 
among MDMA users, while among non-MDMA users, drug use was mainly limited 
to alcohol, cannabis, and tobacco. There were large differences between MDMA users 
and non-MDMA users in the total number of cannabis “joints” smoked, the mean 
period of abstinence from cannabis, and the frequency of cannabis use. For total 
number of joints smoked and period of abstinence these differences were non-
significant t (20) = 0.92, and t (11.04) = -1.53, respectively, p>.05 in both cases.  In 
both cases standard deviations were large and Levene’s test was significant in relation 
to period of abstinence. Clearly, these non-significant results need to be treated with 
caution given the relatively small number of cannabis users among the non-MDMA 
group. The group difference was significant for frequency of cannabis use, t (14.98) = 
2.94, p<.05. 
< Insert table 2 about here > 
 
Syllogistic Reasoning: Main Analysis. 
Table 3 reveals that MDMA users performed worse than non-users both on the 
one-model and on the three-model/NVC syllogisms although in the latter case the 
group difference was less pronounced. Mixed ANOVA yielded a significant models 
by user interaction, F(1,46)=5.56, p<.05, with an effect size of 10.8% (i.e., partial eta 
squared = .108). Subsequent analyses revealed that MDMA users performed 
significantly worse on the one-model syllogisms, F(1,46) = 11.24, p<.01, but there 
was little difference between the groups on the NVC/three-model problems, F < 1.  
   < Insert table 3 about here > 
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Covariate Analyses. 
Working memory and executive functioning. It is possible that the observed 
MDMA related deficit in syllogistic reasoning might be mediated by working memory 
components. MDMA users performed significantly worse than nonusers on the 
computation span measure. ANCOVA with computation span as a covariate generated 
a significant result with respect to computation span, F (1, 44)=7.23, p<.05. 
Consistent with this, the interaction effect between MDMA user group and models, on 
syllogistic reasoning, was reduced to below statistical significance after control for 
differences in computation span
3
, F(1,44) = 2.41, p>.05, and the effect size was 
reduced to 5.2%, approximately half its original magnitude. The main effect of user 
group was also reduced to below statistical significance
4
, F<1. By way of contrast, 
ANCOVA with random letter generation as a covariate generated a non-significant 
result with respect to random generation, F < 1. The interaction effect between group 
and models, on syllogistic reasoning, remained significant after control for random 
generation, F(1,45) = 4.59, p<.05, and at 9.3% the effect size was barely reduced at 
all. In both analyses the group by covariate interactions were non-significant, F < 1, 
indicating that homogeneity of regression was obtained. 
Sleep Quality. As noted above, with regard to whether individuals viewed 
themselves as morning or evening types, relative to nonusers, MDMA users were 
more likely to see themselves as evening types. To establish whether this outcome had 
any effect on group differences in reasoning performance, each participant’s ordinal 
response for the sleep type variable (ranging from 1 = definitely a morning type, to 5 
= definitely an evening type) was entered as a covariate and the main analysis 
repeated. This produced a non-significant result with respect to the covariate, F< 1, 
and the groups by models interaction effect on syllogistic reasoning remained 
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significant, F(1,45) = 4.52, p<.05. Homogeneity of regression was obtained, F < 1 for 
the group by covariate interaction. Thus it appears that group differences in aspects of 
sleep quality were not responsible for the MDMA related impairments in syllogistic 
reasoning performance
5
. 
Other Drugs. It was necessary to establish whether the prevalence of polydrug 
use, especially among the MDMA user group (see Table 2), contributed to the 
MDMA-related differences in reasoning performance. ANCOVA with frequency of 
cannabis use as a covariate
6
 reduced the interaction between group and models to 
below statistical significance, F(1,45) = 2.15, p>.05. The main effect of user group 
was also reduced to below statistical significance, F(1,45) = 2.57, p>.05. 
Homogeneity of regression was obtained, F < 1, for the group by covariate 
interaction. However, subsequent ANCOVA with the number of correct one-model 
syllogisms as the sole dependent variable, group between participants, and frequency 
of cannabis use as the covariate, left the main effect of group statistically significant, 
F(1,45)=4.64, p<.05, and homogeneity of regression was obtained, F(1,44)=1.75, 
p>.05, for the group by covariate interaction.  
The possibility that prolonged cannabis use might produce a cumulative 
decrement in syllogistic reasoning performance was also evaluated. An estimate of 
lifetime cannabis use was included as a covariate
7
 and the main analysis was repeated. 
The interaction between groups and models was reduced to just below significance, 
F(1,45) = 3.71, p=.061. However, the main effect of user group remained significant, 
F(1,45) = 3.77, p<.05, one tailed. Homogeneity of regression was obtained, F< 1, for 
the group by covariate interaction. Again, subsequent ANCOVA with the number of 
correct one-model syllogisms as the sole dependent variable, group between 
participants, and lifetime cannabis use as the covariate, left the main effect of group 
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statistically significant, F(1,45)=7.15, p<.05, and homogeneity of regression was 
obtained, F<1, for the group by covariate interaction. 
In view of the fact that some of the participants, both MDMA users and 
nonusers, had smoked cannabis during the week prior to testing, for all cannabis 
users, time since last use of cannabis was correlated with performance on the 
syllogisms. This yielded non significant correlation coefficients of .05 and .07 for the 
one-model and the three-model/NVC syllogisms respectively, p>.05, n=29, in both 
cases.  
Thus on balance it appears that the MDMA-related deficits in syllogistic 
reasoning remain significant following statistical controls for various measures of 
cannabis use. Nonetheless the possibility that cannabis exerts an influence cannot be 
entirely excluded. The correlation coefficient between lifetime use of cannabis and 
performance on the one-model syllogisms was   –0.36, p<.05. This compares with a 
correlation of -0.40, p<.01, between lifetime use of MDMA and performance on the 
one-model syllogisms, (for the three-model/NVC syllogisms neither of the equivalent 
correlations were statistically significant).  
While 55% of MDMA users smoked cigarettes, only 23% of nonusers were 
smokers. Therefore it is possible that users might have been more susceptible to 
nicotine deprivation during testing. Furthermore, while both groups consumed alcohol 
regularly, MDMA users consumed almost twice as many units per week compared to 
nonusers. To evaluate the potentially confounding effects of these variables, the 
number of cigarettes consumed per day and the units of alcohol per week were 
entered as covariates. The interaction between groups and models was reduced to just 
below significance, F(1,44) = 3.54, p=.067. However, the main effect of user group 
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remained significant, F(1,44) = 7.45, p<.01, and homogeneity of regression was 
obtained, F<1, for the two group by covariate interactions.  
With regard to the use of other illicit drugs, Table 2 reveals that MDMA users 
had previously consumed amphetamine and mushrooms. In addition they were also 
currently consuming poppers and cocaine. It would have been desirable to statistically 
control for the effects of these other drugs; however, there were insufficient users of 
them among the non-MDMA user group to perform ANCOVA since it was not 
possible to properly test for homogeneity of regression. To try to distinguish the 
effects of the individual drugs, multiple regression analysis was conducted. Two 
separate regressions were run, the first with the number of correct responses on the 
one-model syllogisms as the dependent variable, the second with the number of 
correct responses on the three-model/NVC syllogisms as the dependent variable. For 
both regressions, independent variables were estimates of lifetime consumption of 
amphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, and MDMA
8
. For the one-model syllogisms the 
regression model accounted for a significant proportion of the variance, R squared = 
.243, F(4,43) = 3.45, p<.05. However, the regression model failed to reach 
significance for the three-model/NVC syllogisms, R squared = .063, F < 1. 
Examination of Table 4 reveals that for the one-model syllogisms total lifetime use of 
MDMA was the only significant predictor, uniquely accounting for around 7% of the 
variance. With the exception of total use of cannabis, the standardised beta 
coefficients were negative for all of the predictors, indicating that performance on the 
one-model syllogisms declines as lifetime consumption of each of the predictors 
increases.  
   < Insert table 4 about here > 
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In situations where ANCOVA cannot be used and as an alternative to 
regression analysis, a further method to control for the potentially confounding effects 
of these other drugs is to exclude all users of each drug in turn and reanalyse the data. 
Although this technique has its limitations, in that it ignores the likelihood that there 
are correlations between the use of these other drugs, nonetheless it does provide at 
least some degree of control for their use. Therefore the main analysis, with user 
group between participants and models within, was repeated excluding all those who 
had used a particular substance during the last three months. This was done with 
respect to amphetamine, cocaine, mushrooms, poppers, and tobacco.  
In all but one case this reduced the group by models interaction to below 
statistical significance. Specifically, F values for the models by user group interaction 
were as follows: F(1,43) = 3.46, p=.070, excluding amphetamine users; F < 1, 
excluding cocaine users; F(1,44) = 6.69, p<.05, excluding ‘mushroom’ users; F(1,35) 
= 1.75, p>.05, excluding ‘poppers’ users; and F < 1 excluding tobacco users. 
However, in each of the analyses the main effect of MDMA user group remained 
statistically significant with MDMA users obtaining fewer correct responses 
compared to nonusers. F values were as follows: F(1,43) = 4.39, p<.05, excluding 
amphetamine users; F(1,34) = 12.31, p<.01, excluding cocaine users; F(1,44) = 5.31, 
p<.05, excluding ‘mushroom’ users; F(1,35) = 10.29, p<.01, excluding ‘poppers’ 
users; and F(1,28) = 4.92, p<.05, excluding tobacco users. For MDMA users and non 
MDMA users respectively, sample sizes were 19 and 26 excluding amphetamine 
users; 11 and 25 excluding cocaine users; 20 and 26 excluding ‘mushroom’ users; 12 
and 25 excluding ‘poppers’ users; and 10 and 20 excluding tobacco users. 
Thus by way of summary, in relation to the possible confounding effects of 
these other drugs, the main effect of MDMA user group remained significant when 
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the analyses were rerun excluding users of each of the other drugs in question. 
Furthermore, in the regression analyses, among the total use variables that were 
included as independent variables, only MDMA proved to be significant as a predictor 
of performance on the one-model syllogisms.  
 
DISCUSSION. 
As expected, the present results demonstrate an MDMA related deficit in 
syllogistic reasoning. Furthermore since the average reported period of abstinence was 
4.61 weeks, the results observed are unlikely to be a short-term consequence of using 
the drug. Contrary to expectations, there was no group difference on the NVC and 
three-model syllogisms. MDMA users did, however, perform significantly worse than 
nonusers on the one-model syllogisms. The absence of group differences on the NVC 
and three-model syllogisms is difficult to reconcile with Johnson-Laird’s (1983) 
account of mental models theory. It does however provide further support for Evans et 
al (1999), who maintain that individuals generally construct only a single mental 
model of the premises and fail to search for alternatives. From either perspective, for 
both one-model and more complex syllogisms, the premises need to be retained so 
that alternative possible conclusions can be accepted or rejected in the context of the 
initial mental model and the contents of working memory updated as necessary. The 
MDMA related deficit evident in the one model context appears to be consistent with 
some degree of impairment in this process. In the NVC/three model situation where 
according to Evans et al only a single model is constructed, this model does not itself 
constitute an exhaustive representation of the implications of the premises and for 
both users and nonusers, most inferences derived from it are therefore likely to be 
erroneous. Therefore, consistent with the findings reported here, group differences 
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would not be expected on the NVC/three model problems. Apart from the present 
findings other evidence has been obtained consistent with Evans at al’s 
conceptualisation of reasoning processes. For example, Newstead and co-workers 
have demonstrated that many individuals do not proceed beyond the initial model of 
the premises relying solely on it when constructing their inference (Newstead, 
Handley, &, Buck, 1999; Newstead, Thompson, & Handley, 2002). Similar findings 
have been also reported by Handley, Dennis, Evans, & Capon (2000). 
It was possible that any group differences in syllogistic reasoning were due to 
reduced working memory and executive resources rather than a specific deficit in 
underlying reasoning competence. Computation span was significantly lower in 
MDMA users, and when included as a covariate this measure accounted for half of the 
MDMA-related variance in syllogistic reasoning. This suggests that the MDMA 
related deficit in syllogistic reasoning might be attributable to executive impairment 
rather than a consequence of some fundamental deficit in underlying reasoning 
competence. However, this is not to minimise the implications of the present findings. 
Even if it is the case that underlying reasoning competence remains intact in MDMA 
users, given that they lack the executive resources to make full use of this capacity, 
they are still likely to exhibit impairments in the capacity for rational thought.  
It is worthy of note that while there were MDMA-related differences in 
computation span, no such trend was evident in the random letter generation scores 
and inclusion of the latter as a covariate did not attenuate the group differences in 
reasoning performance.  In fact previous research has shown that performance on the 
two working memory executive measures is not invariably correlated (Lehto, 1996; 
Miyake et al, 2000) and it has been argued that each measure loads on a qualitatively 
different aspect of executive functioning (Fisk & Sharp 2004, Miyake et al, 2000). 
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Thus the present results suggest that MDMA-related deficits are most apparent in 
those aspects of executive functioning captured by the computation span measure and 
that these deficits produce knock-on effects on reasoning performance. 
A number of background variables were considered in the present study 
including various measures of sleep and wakefulness. These appear to play no part in 
the group differences in syllogistic reasoning that were obtained. However, the 
measures that were used were largely self-report and it remains possible that more 
physiologically based measures might have produced a different outcome. Therefore 
the possibility that sleep impairment mediates some or all of the MDMA-related 
effects cannot be totally excluded. 
An important aspect that was addressed in the present study was the 
potentially confounding effect of other drugs. The use of other drugs was much more 
common among the MDMA user group, and with a few exceptions, the use of other 
drugs among the non-MDMA group was limited to alcohol, tobacco and cannabis. 
Analyses of covariance with various measures of alcohol, tobacco and cannabis use as 
covariates were conducted, and in all cases, at least in relation to the one-model 
syllogisms, MDMA users remained significantly impaired. Furthermore, regression 
analysis revealed that measures of total use of cocaine and amphetamine were not 
significant predictors of performance on the one-model syllogisms, indeed total use of 
MDMA was the only significant predictor.  While these results highlight the 
importance of MDMA in accounting for the results obtained, the possibility that other 
drugs might exert some impact cannot be totally excluded. For example, total 
cannabis use among the whole sample was significantly and negatively correlated 
with performance on the one-model syllogisms.  
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It remains unclear whether this potential cannabis related effect is mediated 
through executive or non-executive processes. Interestingly, in the normal population, 
Fisk and Sharp (2002) found that syllogistic reasoning performance was positively 
correlated with word fluency scores. In turn, it has been suggested that word fluency 
taps an important aspect of executive functioning: access to semantic memory (Fisk & 
Sharp, 2004). While there is little evidence to link MDMA with impaired word 
fluency performance, cannabis use has been found to produce such an effect (e.g., 
Croft et al, 2000; Klugman et al, 1999). Thus it is possible that cannabis impairs this 
aspect of executive functioning thereby producing a detrimental effect on syllogistic 
reasoning. However, it must be acknowledged that this possibility is speculative and 
requires further investigation. 
A number of limitations were evident in the present study, for example, we 
were reliant on individuals being willing and able to provide an accurate account of 
their previous drug use. Furthermore, it was not possible to quantify the amounts of 
each psychoactive drug present within the tablets or joints consumed and additionally, 
because of limited resources, we were unable to use urine, saliva, or hair samples to 
confirm recent patterns of drug use. However, the drug use questionnaire was 
designed to check the internal consistency of the information provided. It is equally 
worthy of note that most of the published studies that have probed cognitive deficits 
among MDMA users have not resorted to urine, hair, or saliva testing  (e.g., Fox et al, 
2002; Morgan, 1999; Parrott & Lasky, 1998; Rodgers, 2000). 
Aside from the issue of drug testing other limitations of the present study need 
to be acknowledged. For example, lifestyle differences and premorbid factors cannot 
be excluded as possible sources of group differences in studies of this nature. MDMA 
users may neglect their diet and physical health. Studies have reported that they suffer 
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from a range of sub-clinical conditions including depression, anxiety, paranoia, and 
phobias (Morgan et al, 2002). Depression and anxiety have been shown to impair 
cognitive functioning (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Murphy, Michael, Robbins, & 
Sahakian, 2003) and so it is possible that these aspects of psychological affect may 
have mediated some of the effects observed in the present study. This is clearly a 
possibility that needs to be addressed in future research. Furthermore, it has also been 
suggested that MDMA users are subject to a heightened state of impulsivity (Morgan, 
1998). In the present study, this may have resulted in responses being produced before 
their logical necessity had been thoroughly probed. It is also important not to over 
generalise from the present findings. For example, given that word of mouth referral 
was used as the primary means of recruiting participants, our MDMA-user group may 
not be entirely representative of all MDMA users, especially those who consume the 
drug in settings that are unlike those frequented by those individuals constituting the 
present sample. 
In conclusion, the results of the present study show that syllogistic reasoning 
is impaired among MDMA users. This impairment may be a consequence of an 
MDMA-related decline in aspects of working memory and executive functioning. 
Furthermore, while the impairment appears to be associated with MDMA use, it 
remains possible that other drugs including cannabis may also exert an influence 
either independently or in conjunction with MDMA. 
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Table 1.  
 
Performance of MDMA users (n=22) and Nonusers (n=26) on Background Variables.  
 
    MDMA user   Non-User 
 
    Mean      S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
 
Age            21.36      1.67  21.31  1.69 
Education (years)    15.05      2.84  15.96  1.89 
Raven’s Total Score    47.43      6.53  48.28  5.52 
NART      27.95      7.60  30.19  6.07 
Digit span       6.52      1.21    6.88  1.21 
Computation span      3.00      1.58    4.88  1.63*** 
Random generation              0.05      0.38              -0.09  0.28 
Self report health (median)         4        -         4               - 
Epworth Sleep Scale  
(total score)              5.33      2.67     6.50  2.53 
 
Sleep hour per night      8.09      1.49     8.10  0.85 
 
Sleep Refreshed (median)        2         -                    2    -     
 
Sleep Quality (median)                 2         -           2    - 
 
Sleep Morning/Evening Type   
(neutral/morning type, %)           23              -       46*    -  
 
Sometimes miss out                     86                    -         73    - 
a night’s sleep (%)    
  
 
Questions and Response alternatives. 
Sleep Refreshed: How refreshed do you feel in the morning?  
Responses: 1= very alert, 2 = fairly alert, 3 = fairly tired, 4 = very tired. 
 
Sleep Quality: How well do you normally sleep at nights?  
Responses: 1 = very well, 2 = satisfactory, 3 = not very well, 4 = very badly. 
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Sleep Morning/Evening Type: We hear about people who feel better in the morning or 
who feel better in the evening. Which of these two types do you think you are? 
Responses, 1= definitely a morning type, 2= more morning than evening, 3= neither 
one nor the other, 4= more evening than morning, 5= definitely an evening type. 
 
Statistical Tests. 
Age, education, Raven’s, digit span, computation span, random generation: t test.  
Self report health, sleep refreshed, sleep quality, sleep morning/evening type: Mann-
Whitney U. Sometimes miss out a nights sleep: chi-squared. 
 
*** p<.001; * p<.05 
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Table 2 
History of Drug Use 
          MDMA user   Non-User 
    Mean     S.D.        n  Mean    S.D.     n      p 
Lifetime Use: Number of  
MDMA Tablets consumed 303.30   374.04     22            -       -    -       - 
 
Length of MDMA        164.82     99.58     22            -       -    -       - 
Use (weeks) 
 
Weeks since MDMA     4.61      6.82      22            -       -    -       -
  
last used 
 
Frequency of MDMA use    0.47       0.40      22            -       -    -       - 
(times per week) 
 
Cigarettes (number per day)    9.62      4.19      13       11.50   4.87       5      ns 
 
Alcohol (units per week)  21.82    11.14      22       11.83  8.19  26   *** 
 
Other Drugs 
 
Frequency (current users only) 
times per week 
        
       Cannabis                         2.58      2.54      15         0.63            0.31       6      * 
 
       Cocaine                           0.76      0.54      11            -                   -         -       - 
 
 
Lifetime Use:  
 
       Amphetamine (g)       102.20   220.14       5            -         -         -       - 
  
       Cannabis (joints)     4700.44   7040.93     16    1986.00     1883.40        6      ns 
 
       Cocaine  (g)                56.84        79.26     11           -         -         -       - 
 
 
Weeks since  
last use 
 
       Amphetamine            62.24     92.89     10  -       -         -        - 
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       Cannabis   1.68       4.64     18         9.23         15.99       11      ns 
 
       Cocaine   6.75     15.53     16         2.00        -         1      - 
 
 Mushrooms            62.98     66.75       7  -        -         -       - 
 
 Poppers            15.91     18.17     19        52.00        -         1      -  
 
Percentage of Participants  
Using Other Drugs During  
the 3 Months Prior to  
Testing. 
 
Alcohol                       100 100 
Amphetamine               14     0 
Cannabis                   86   46 
Cocaine                      50     4 
Mushrooms                       9     0 
Poppers                          46     4 
Tobacco                         55   23 
 
*** p<.001; * p<.05; ns p>.05; via t test 
Means and standard deviations relate only to those individuals taking the drug in 
question. 
 
In some cases where individuals were only occasional users, they were unable to 
provide an accurate estimate of their lifetime use.
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Table 3 
Average number of correct responses for one-model syllogisms and NVC/three-model 
syllogisms for MDMA users (n=22) and non-users (n=26) 
    Users           Non-users   
   Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
 
One-model  3.45  2.13  5.27  1.61**  
 
NVC/Three-model 1.45  1.99  1.81  1.58 
Overall 
percentage  
correct            30.62             44.25 
 
 
** p<.01 
Note: for the four one-model problems (for which there were two valid conclusions 
per syllogism), and the eight three-model/NVC syllogisms (for which there was one 
valid conclusion per syllogism), the maximum possible score was eight. 
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Table 4 
Results from Regression Analysis with Number of Correct Syllogism Responses as 
Dependent Variables and Measures of Lifetime Use of Other Drugs as Independent 
Variables. 
 
Independent 
variable 
Standardised 
beta weight 
t value Squared semi-
partial 
correlation 
coefficient 
Total lifetime 
use: 
 
Correct One-model Syllogisms 
 
Amphetamine 
 
-.260 -0.65 .007 
Cannabis 
 
 .197  0.66 .008 
Cocaine 
 
-.175 -0.55 .005 
MDMA 
 
-.408 -2.03* .072 
Total lifetime 
use: 
Correct Three-model/NVC Syllogisms 
Amphetamine 
 
-.639 -1.43 .045 
Cannabis 
 
 .179  0.54 .006 
Cocaine 
 
 .445  1.25 .034 
MDMA 
 
-.246 -1.10 .026 
 
* p<.05 
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1
 While a full description of the distinction between one, two, and three model syllogisms is beyond the 
scope of the present paper, such a description can be found in Fisk and Sharp (2002, pp 1274-5) and 
Johnson-Laird (1983, pp. 98-100). 
2
 For those persons using other illicit drugs, the mean period of abstinence in weeks was 62.24 for 
amphetamine, 4.55 for cannabis, 6.47 for cocaine, 62.98 for ‘magic mushrooms’, and 17.71 for 
‘poppers’. 
3
 Control for digit span produced no substantial degree of attenuation. The interaction between group 
and models remained significant, F(1,44) = 6.03, p<.05, with the effect size 12.0%. 
4
 Prior to the inclusion of computation span as a covariate, the main effect of user group yielded 
F(1,46)=6.41, p<.05. 
5
 It is possible that Ecstasy related differences in the morning/evening type ratings may have played 
some role in producing the computation span group differences thereby indirectly accounting for some 
of the syllogistic reasoning deficits. However, ANCOVA with computation span as the dependent 
variable, Ecstasy user group as the independent variable, and the sleep measure as a covariate, left the 
group difference in computation span and the corresponding effect size intact, F(1,44) = 17.05, p<.001. 
Thus it appears that the sleep measure plays no role, either direct or indirect, in accounting for the 
syllogistic reasoning deficit. 
6
 A value of zero was entered for those persons who had never consumed cannabis 
7
 A value of zero was entered for those persons who had never consumed cannabis. 
8
 It is difficult to meaningfully quantify lifetime consumption of poppers so this substance was not 
included in the regression analyses. 
